This study, examines the influence of political considerations on intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Ghana. The two-step system GMM approach was used to estimate transfers and elections data for 167 districts from 1994 to 2014. The analysis was country-wide, and new versus mature democracy in swing and aligned districts.
Introduction
The influence of tactical considerations on resource distribution is amply demonstrated in many studies (Colantoni et al 1975; Anderson and Tollison, 1991; Grossman, 1994; Bickers and Stein, 1996) . The evidence from these studies reveal a strong relationship between resource transfers and political considerations, such as voting patterns, timing of elections, geographical locations and lobbying activities among others. In recent times, however, a more completely different picture of distributive politics has emerged with studies including (Dahleberg and Johansson, 2002; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006; Veiga and Pinho, 2007; and Cole, 2009 ). These new cases tend to focus on the ideological attachment of the voters and nature of politicians in a jurisdiction and how resources are targeted at them. Nonetheless, it is argued that for any resource distribution, the normative principles of equity and efficiency must supplant political motives. This principle assumes that central governments act as benevolent entities interested in maximizing social welfare, and by this assertion, the economic and institutional rationale for intergovernmental transfers is underscored (Oates, 1972 and Musgrave, 1983) . Evidence from evolution of political economy models has brought to light how politicians use transfers as tactical instrument to achieve certain political objectives. Cox and McCubbins' (1986) politicaleconomy model explains that in partisan politics, resource sharing may reflect patronage objectives in favour of loyal political followers. In contrast, Dixit and Londregan (1996) argue that opportunistic politicians, who want to increase their chances of re-election, could design an allocation programme in favour of non-loyal supporters or 'swing voters'.
Given these two ideological positions, the empirical evidence is inconclusive with respect to which political type, partisan or opportunistic is relevant and which group of voters, swing or aligned is favoured in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. For instance, Johansson (2003) and Arulampalam et al (2009) support the claim that design of intergovernmental transfers favour swing voters, while Levtt and Snyder (1995) and Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) confirm that larger transfers go to areas where the incumbent party have strong support base. Since politics affect resource allocations across different groups of politicians and political jurisdictions, it is imperative to extend the empirical evidence within different country settings.
Therefore, this study contributes to the debate by examining how intergovernmental fiscal transfers are used as tactical political tool in Ghana focusing on the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), a formula-based grant distribution system which was conceived in 1992 but became operational in 1994.
The formula-based allocation system is meant to prevent tactical political influences over the transfers, and it is a common strategy in most decentralised countries in the developing world.
However, it should be noted that such a system does not guarantee an objective and efficient distribution of resources. In many countries, the formula is manipulated in many ways to suit specific objectives including political, thereby altering the distribution of the funds. For example, in the mid-1990s, Russia's allocation formula was diluted with changes in assigned weights, hence was not consistently followed by the central government. This is because they discovered that the existing formula could not produce any politically desirable results (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex, 2001) . Ekpo (2004) also reports of the tendency of some states in Nigeria to manipulate census data so that they can receive more revenue from the federation account, since population factor constitute 30% of the sharing formula.
In the case of Ghana, since the inception of the allocation formula in 1994, it has undergone several changes but four main factors continue to dominate, namely, 'need', 'equality', 'service pressure' and 'responsiveness'. While these factors have remained the same, their composition and their weights have changed many times, particularly the need factor. For instance, in 1994 need factor consisted of the 1992 GDP per capita and population; in 1996 however, number of health and basic education facilities, as well as the 1992 GDP per capita were used. In 2000, population per medical doctor and pupil per teacher ratios were considered while 1992 GDP per capita was dropped. In 2002, proportion of districts with access to safe drinking water was added, and in 2004, mileage of tarred roads, as well as nurses per capita was added as indicators (Banful, 2007) . In 2007, there was an increase in the percentage of taxable revenue from 5% to 7.5%, apparently to cater for additional districts created by the President 2 . It should be noted that similar changes have also occurred in the other factors as well, and the most critical ones were in election years (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012) . Appendix A, shows a summary of events over time in respect of the formula. This numerous and rampant changes have been subject of much concern for many people including policymakers, particularly about the effective administration of the transfers system devoid of any political motives. Despite this concern, there is a dearth of empirical studies on whether the Ghanaian formula system of allocation completely alienates tactical political influences. This research therefore aims at examining the extent to which the DACF sharing formula eliminates political maneuverings. By undertaking this enquiry, an attempt is made to provide answers to the following questions: does the quest to entrench political support in aligned or swing districts affect the transfer system; and how do electoral outcomes affect political considerations of the transfers, as democracy evolves over time.
Apart from its contribution to the extant literature on intergovernmental transfers, the novelty of this study, particularly concerning Ghana is the use of the electoral outcomes (presidential and parliamentary) to construct indices of politically aligned and swing districts for the analysis. In addition, this research examines the role of political factors on the transfers as the country's democratic status changes from 'new' to 'mature'. According to Brender and Drazen's (2005) classification of democratic periods, three alternative definitions are used to characterise 'new'
and 'mature' democracy. These are: the period spanning the first four competitive elections; the first ten years of democracy; and the first fifteen years of a democratic period. The relevance of this classification is that pre-election fiscal manipulations and implementations of political budget cycles by incumbent governments are likely to occur in countries with short electoral history (Viego and Pinho, 2007) . Also, the estimation approach adopted which is based on the Generalised Method Moments (GMM) in dynamic panel settings developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . This is unique because previous studies on Ghana were based on fixed effects model within a static panel framework (see, Banful, 2007; and Miguel and Zaidi, 2003) However, model specifications in this framework assume a strict exogeneity of the dependent variable (in this case, the transfers). In view of the feedback effects generated by the districts' actions on the transfers, the assumption collapses and a likely problem of simultaneity bias is created which affects the reliability of the estimates. Hence, the current approach introduces lag of the dependent variable as one of the explanatory variables to cater for this problem.
Following this first section, the rest of the study is structured into five sections. Section two presents the intergovernmental fiscal relations in Ghana, while section three reviews the 5 literature with a focus on some empirical evidence. Section four covers the theoretical and empirical frameworks, as well as data and estimation techniques. Section five reports the empirical estimates and their interpretations, as the last section gives the conclusion and also provides some lessons for policy.
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relation in Ghana
The intergovernmental fiscal relations describe all aspects of expenditure, revenue and service delivery arrangements between the national and sub-national levels of government. This includes the assignment of functions; authority for decision-making over resources and staffing; taxing and regulatory responsibilities; funding arrangements; financial management and accountability. Although, there are various sources of income for the districts aside transfers, they do not yield much revenue, so some districts depend almost entirely on the DACF. Therefore, DACF has become the single most significant source of funding for majority of the district assemblies particularly the rural ones. However, with an average of 80 percent of the revenue of the district assemblies being derived from the DACF, the transfers generate a direct link between government influence and welfare of people at the district level. As a result, this situation creates opportunity for central governments to use the DACF as political machine to produce gainful political outcomes.
The DACF is currently 7.5% of total tax revenue accruing to the government excluding grants from development partners, which is distributed among the district assemblies through a formula.
This relatively small share of the national revenue seems to disguise some important realities of district level financing in Ghana. That is, in the absence of these transfers, some district assemblies would not be able to provide their residents with basic services, such as health and education. Moreover, increased demands on the district assemblies to undertake development projects and expand service delivery, has led to the DACF becoming such an important revenue source since 1994. It helps district assemblies to cover costs associated with mandated provision of socio-economic goods and services, particularly to the most deprived communities. The transfers are perceived by voters in Ghana as benefits emanating from a particular political party in office at the national level; hence, it has become a channel for politicians to manipulate its allocation to the districts. Therefore, it is important that the formula-based strategy of allocation be made to function as expected devoid of any political manipulations. The yearly releases of transfers from the government in millions of Ghana cedis, number of districts and the percentage of deductible taxable revenue are shown in appendix B.
Some Empirical Evidence
The issue of political parties allocating distributive resources to some set of targeted individuals or groups was first raised in the analysis of New Deal spending during the era of great depression in the United States. At the time, states in the West received far greater per capita transfers than the relatively poorer states in the South. Researchers observed that the redistributive decision is influenced by political factors rather than by economic ones (Arrington, 1969; Reading, 1973; Wright, 1974) . Nevertheless, Wallis (1998) 
3: The Theoretical framework
The framework draws heavily on the models of redistributive politics by Londregan (1995, 1996) as used in Dahlberg and Johansson (1999) , as well as Banful (2007) . Consider a country consisting of N subnational governments (districts) whose national government has the sole responsibility is to make transfers to districts out of an endowment of size Y which is exogenously given. The transfer amount may differ across districts but individuals within a district receive the same amount. The "Government" consists of one president who has agenda setting power on the distribution of Y, and N members of parliament, one each from each district, who through their legislative votes can accept or reject the proposed distribution of Y.
There are two political parties competing to be in power, Party A is the party of the incumbent President and Party B, the opposition party. The President is elected by winning a national majority at the presidential election and a member of parliament by winning majority votes cast at the parliamentary elections in the district. Voters have ideological preferences over the parties and decide which party to vote for, taking these preferences into consideration and the amount of transfers the incumbent government offers to each district, as well as the amount the opposition party promises to offer if elected.
In each district, there is a distribution of ideological preferences, and given a certain level of district transfers, there will be a critical value (cut-point) that divides voters into those voting for party A and those for party B. the parties' ultimate objective is to move this cut-point in order to 10 increase their vote shares, by using transfers to the districts. The amount of transfers a district receives will hence be positively correlated with the density at the cut-point. This theory further predicts that transfers are targeted at districts with low income, since voters with low income has higher marginal utility of money and thus can be more easily persuaded to vote for a party promising them high transfers. Given the parties' objective functions, and assuming that the distribution function is symmetric and single peaked, then there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the density at the cut-point and the closeness of the last election.
A more formal presentation of the theoretical framework is as follows:
There are two parties, A and B, maximizing the number of votes. The utility of a voter in district i is given by Ui(yi + Gi) where yi is the income of a voter in district i, Gi is the transfer received and Ui is a utility function such that U'i>0 and U''i<0. A voter located in district i, with the preference X for Party A over Party B, will vote for Party B if:
The critical value or cut-point for district i whereby all citizens of district i with values of X less than Xi will vote for Party B and all the rest for Party A is defined as:
In each district, there is a distribution of X given by
The vote share for party B (VPB) is then given by:
where i P is the share of the population living in district i. This is maximised by the party by choosing the amount of transfers to distribute to each district, thus ip G , p = A, B; subject to
where Y is the available endowment. In equilibrium, both parties choose the same transfers/promises given by the condition.
Therefore, transfers become an increasing function of the density at the cut-point, () i X  , and a decreasing function of income as higher income means lower marginal utility of income 7
Model Specification
Based on the theoretical model, the baseline empirical model is expressed in a dynamic specification form as follows:
where the dependent variable, yit , is per capita transfers that a district i receives from the central government in year t; Pit is a vector of political variables which may influence the distribution;
Xit is a vector of control variables; δj is a parameter to be estimated, β ' and γ ' are vectors of parameters to be estimated, vi represents unobserved effect specific to district i and εit denotes the error term. To account for autoregressive component of the time-series of the transfers, the empirical model includes lags (of order k) of the dependent variable.
Given the district specific-effects (vi) in the model, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation with the lagged dependent variables lead to a potential dynamic bias due to correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term. Pooled OLS estimation would also produce inconsistent result because of the assumption of constant slope and intercept over the cross section (districts) which is unrealistic in this case. As such, the fixed effects (FE) or random effects model is considered to be appropriate as it allows the intercept term to vary, thereby correcting for both cross-sectional and contemporaneous correlations. However, even if there were no serial correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term, the bias would still occur because there is a clear dominance of cross section (N=167) over the time component (T=22) in the data set. To overcome this bias problem, the study uses the system Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) as it controls for both district specific effects and the bias from the lagged dependent variable. This is 12 done by first differencing equation (6) to remove the district specific effect (vi), and using instrumental variables to estimate the resultant equation (7):
Due to the potential weakness of the instruments in the face of first differenced and persistent time series variables which may result in bias coefficients, the original equation in levels is added to the system. As a result, the appropriate instruments become the lagged values of the first-differences in the levels form equation. The post-estimation Sargan test of overidentification is used to validate the instruments. To ascertain if the models are well specified and devoid of autocorrelation among the variables, the autoregressive test of order 1, AR(1) and 2 AR(2) are used.
Equation (7) is applied to Rogoff and Sibert (1988) opportunistic political budget cycles prediction that central governments transfer larger resources to subnational governments in election years to their electoral fortunes. To examine this prediction, the study uses an election year dummy (ELYDum) which equals to one (1) in election years, and zero otherwise. The specification is expressed in equation (8) which is substituted into equation (7) for estimation.
According to Arulampalam et al (2009) , the theory predicts that aligned and swing districts obtain higher transfers relative to a non-swing district. To also test this predictions, the study considers the political variables as Swing and Alignment, which are constructed as dummy variables. To allow for the influence of political considerations on the transfers to vary according to the party and electoral dynamics in the country, the vector of political variable is specified in the form of interacted regressors. The dynamics of this prediction is shown in (9), and it is subsequently substituted into equation (7) for estimation. (3) is that a vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of Parliament is needed to pass a resolution on a bill to become a binding law 9 . As such, it is the desire of every party in government to win two-thirds majority in every parliamentary election, so they can unilaterally enact or amend legislations without bargaining with rival parties.
To test whether the effects of political factors on the transfers (if any) have changed over time since 1994, the study adopts the classifications of democratic period by Brenda and Drazen (2005) . Based on this, Ghana's democracy is considered to be mature as it is over two decades old. Following Viega and Pinho (2007), two dummies are created, newdem and matdem to partition the democratic period into new and mature. Equation (6) is then augmented with interaction terms of newdem and matdem with all variables in vector Pit to yield equation 10.
8 Votediff index is computed by considering a multiparty democratic system with M contesting parties in electoral constituency, c of district i. Assume that party A, with a vote share of Va gains the highest share of total votes casts in i, and party B is the second placed party with total votes share of Vb. Therefore:
)×100
9 The 1992 Constitution Article 291 clause 3 "Where Parliament approves the bill, it may only be presented to the President for assent if it was approved at the second and third readings of it in Parliament by the votes of at least two thirds of all the members of Parliament"
where DEM in the case of newdem takes the value of one (1) for years 1992-2004, and zero (0) afterwards; for the case of matdem, DEM is a dummy variable with a value of one (1) The coefficients are expected to be positive depicting an increase of the funds over time.
Data Sources
A panel of dataset from 1994 to 2014 on 167 district assemblies was obtained from various sources to carry out the analysis. Specifically, data on Ghana's local government public finance 
Results and Discussions
Presented in Table 1 are the descriptive statistics of the variables which show number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of the data. prices and it is used as the benchmark for the analysis. This amount may seem relatively small but its critical role in the socio-economic agenda of the district assemblies cannot be downplayed. This is because the absence of these transfers in the districts, particularly the rural 2.The district population figures were based on estimates from 1986, 2000 and 2010 population census figures given the annual growth rates of the various districts. The district level election results were derived from summation of constituency results within a given district. ones could severely affect their developmental goals as they will not be able to provide basic needs of their populace.
Descriptive statistics

5.1
The 2-Step System GMM Estimates of DACF Transfers (1994-2014) Table 2 reports the results of all districts for the sample period on how political forces influence intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Ghana. Column 1 of Table 2 show results of testing the presence of Political Budget Cycles (PBC) by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) , in the allocation of the DACF transfers and its impact on politically aligned (PAL) and unaligned (1-PAL) districts.
From the estimates, statistical significance of the lagged transfer per capita PCTransf(-1), suggests that there is some level of inertia in the disbursement. In confirmation of the PBC, the result indicates that transfers increase during election years. This is indicated by the positive statistical significance of the election year variable (ELYDum). Other things being equal, transfers per capita increase by 8.4% relative to the benchmark value of GhȻ6.28 in election years.
This evidence supports the findings of Banful (2007) that in election years, districts can expect to receive twenty-five (25) percentage points more in disbursement than they receive in nonelection years. The finding therefore confirms the theoretical prediction by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) that the incumbent government tends to increase transfers to subnational governments in order to improve its popularity and the chances of re-election. According to Brender and Drazen (2005) , political budget cycles may come about because democracy is far more likely to collapse in an election year than any other year. Therefore, election years are considered critical points for the survival of democracy because it is the period many people tend to strongly register their dissatisfaction with the system in various forms including violent protests. This is usually common in developing countries where democratic and political institutions are weak. Hence, it becomes a technical point of disruption in democratic dispensations. On accounts of this, governments tend to provide more transfers in election years under the guise of consolidating democratic gains. Notes:
-System GMM estimation of linear models for panel data which combines levels and first differences equation by using STATA 13 econometric software; -two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples; -T-statistics are between parentheses; -Significance level for which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
The empirical evidence fails to support the Cox and McCubbin's (1986) assertion that politicians favour their supporters in resource distribution, as the political alignment (PAL) variable is not statistically significant but correctly signed. To ascertain, if the political budget cycles favour politically aligned districts or not, the empirical evidence suggests the contrary in the sense that neither of the alignment groups is supported with more transfers. This is seen in the statistically insignificant results of the interaction variable between election year and political alignment (ELYDum*PAL), as well as, election year and political unaligned, ELYDum*(1-PAL). This evidence is corroborated by Dahlberg and Johnsson (2002) for Sweden and Veiga and Pinho (2007) for Portugal. Column 2 of Table 2 , presents the estimation for the case of swing and nonswing districts in relation to transfers during election years. In this case, there is also an evidence of PBCs, and this is shown by the statistical significance of the election year dummy variable (ELYDum), and the transfer per capita increased by 7.5% compared to the sample average.
To determine which class of swing districts is favoured in the transfer process, the result reveals that swing districts are given more support than non-swing districts. The results show statistically significant and negative coefficient of the political swing dummy (PSW) variable as expected.
All else being equal, the transfers increased by 3% relative to the average suggestive that swing districts are tactically targeted in the transfer process in order to enhance their chances of electoral victory. This evidence confirms Dixit and Londregan (1995) proposition that the political players tend to target swing voters to increase their votes in elections. The results also show that the interaction between election years dummy and political swing (ELYDum*PSW) is statistically significant and negative. It implies that the increase in transfers during election years goes to support swing districts in order to win more votes. This evidence can be attributed to the rampant changes to the formula with the major ones happening in election years.
Column 3 in Table 2 provides estimates for six political characteristics of the districts that may affect the distribution. From the result, three out of the six political variables are statistically significant while the other three are not. The aligned variable is not statistically significant but it has the expected sign of positive. However, the coefficient estimate of the swing variable is significant and negative as expected which implies that transfers increase by 3.5% for political swing districts. Given that this tactical distribution of transfer exists, the study further examined 19 whether there is a swing effect in the distribution or not. This is carried out by interaction of swing dummy variables with politically aligned and unaligned variables. The empirical evidence show that both interaction variables are statistically significant and negatively signed, meaning that the negative swing effect dominates the positive alignment effects. However, the magnitude of change in aligned-swing (PAL*PSW) districts exceeded that of unaligned-swing (1-PAL)*PSW districts. The estimates show that the former changed by 0.56% compared to the latter's change of 0.20% suggestive of the dominance of the swing effects.
As regards the vector of control variables, the estimated signs are the same for the three models as shown in Table 2 . The demographic control variables show that the estimates of proportion of young people below age 15 is statistically significant and positive as expected. However, percentage of the elderly above 65 years is statistically significant and negative contrary to expectation. This suggests that the transfers to the districts favour larger group of younger population and do not support small, aging groups of the districts. This may be partially ascribed to the announced objectives of these transfers of which many are connected to ensuring free basic education and child health at the districts and the benefit of scale economies. The economic control variable which is the growth rate of GDP is included in the model to capture the macroeconomic performance of the country. The results show that it has the expected positive sign and statistically significant. This implies that as the economy improves, it impacts on the amount of tax revenue that accrues to the nation, hence the statutory deduction that goes into the DACF also increase. Concerning the time trend variables which control for the passage of time, the coefficient estimates of both Trend and Trendsqr variables are statistically significant and positive. This means that the transfers are not only increasing over time but also growing at an increasing rate.
5.3
The Estimates over Time: New versus Mature Democracy Reported in Table 3 This outcome suggest that in the new democracy voters' loyalty is rewarded as there may be lower transparency in the allocation processes coupled with inexperience of both politicians and voters. However, as democracy mature, politicians and voters become wiser and could easily denounce their allegiance to any party. In this case, the incumbent government undertakes tactical targeting of transfers to swing districts in order to increase votes. In view of the targeted transfers, the results show that relatively higher amount is given to the swing districts than the aligned districts. Other things being constant, the swing districts are expected to receive 5% more while the aligned districts receive 1.8% more than the average transfer amount.
This result is similar to that of Brender and Drazen (2005) , as well as, Viega and Pinho (2007) whose findings indicate that central governments distribute grants strategically among municipalities ran by mayors with party affiliation with the central government in Portugal during the new democracy period.
In Table 3 column 3, the study considers all the possible political factors in terms of swing and aligned that could impact on the transfer process contemporaneously. The estimates reveal that aligned districts received more transfers as the political alignment variable is significant and positive. The increase however, occurred in the new democracy period showing 2% above the average. This is shown in the table by the positive statistical significance of the interaction term between the political alignment variable and the new democracy dummy (Aligned*NewDem). Notes:
22
The results also show that interactions between swing and mature democracy variable (Swing*MatDem) as well as non-swing and mature democracy [(1-Swing)*MatDem] are statistically significant with the expected sign. This further suggests that swing districts are favoured with more transfers in the mature democracy period. The empirical findings indicate that swing districts received approximately 4% increase compared to the average transfer, while the non-swing districts receive about 0.5% more in the mature democracy.
Overall, the political influence on the transfers over the democratic period as shown in Table 3 indicates that while there is a seemingly mixed aligned and swing effect over the two periods, the aligned effect dominates in the new democracy while swing effect dominates in the mature democracy. This suggests a loyalty patronage in the new democracy due to inexperience of the political players as well as weak institutions to monitor the process. However, in the mature democracy period, there is tactical targeting of swing districts to increase vote for re-election by the incumbent governments. Another possible cause of this is the general public doubt in the functioning of new democracies, where citizens have little faith in the survival and efficacy of democracy in delivering good economic outcomes in its budding stages. This perception compels governments to increase transfers to the districts in order to convince the public that there are gains in democracy.
Conclusion and Lessons for Policy
To prevent political maneuverings over intergovernmental transfers, many countries including Ghana have developed a sharing formula to guide them in distributing their fiscal resources in order to ensure fairness. In the light of this, the study makes use of the District Assemblies'
Common Fund (DACF) transfers, which is a formula-based scheme that became operational in 1994 to examine the influence of political considerations on the distribution, and in particular, its dynamics as the 4 th democratic dispensation evolves from new to mature.
The study draws on the theory of redistributive politics by Londregan (1995, 1996) to develop an empirical framework for the analysis. Using a panel data set of election results, transfers per capita to the districts and selected control variables from 1994 to 2014, for 167 23 district assemblies, this research employs the system GMM approach of dynamic linear panel for the empirical estimations.
The empirical outcomes reveal political maneuverings of the sharing formula for political gains as there exists political budget cycle in the allocation mechanism. The evidence show that election years tend to be characterized by higher transfers of about 8.4% more, relative to the average transfers of GhȻ6.28 to the districts. More importantly, the increases in transfers favour swing districts more than aligned ones. The findings further show that as democracy evolves over time, more transfers were allocated to aligned districts in the new democracy era, while in the mature democracy swing districts received more. Specifically, swing districts received 5% more, while aligned districts get 1.8% over the average amount. This suggests that incumbent governments were more opportunistic in the mature democracy period. In general, the utilization of the transfers tend to impact more on the younger population below age 15 years whose needs, such as basic education seem to be provided by the districts than elderly ones above 65 years.
The study also shows that the transfers to the districts are generally growing at an increasing rate which corresponds with the economic performance of the country.
For purposes of policy to insulate the sharing formula from political influences, a team of experts should be set up to design the allocation formula in consultation with stakeholders, such as NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and the District Assemblies (DAs). In addition, since Ghana is a developing country, there is the need to observe policies to develop over time, so the study proposes that changes to the formula be made in intervals of five years after comprehensive review of the existing one and should be legally binding. These measures will help minimise the rampant changes that has bedeviled the formula since its inception, and also bring about separation of powers between those who design the formula and those responsible for its implementation. In this case, Parliament's role would be to ensure that the formula operates within the legal framework and the distribution is done according to the established law. 
DACF Formula Introduced
-Election Year -Change of Formula: Population dropped; Per capita GDP weight reduced by half; Number of Health and education facilities introduced in formula.
Per capita revenue increase added to formula Formula GDP per capita weight reduced to5%. Equality weight increased to 35% as from 1998.
-Election Year -Change in Formula: GDP per capita dropped. Doctor per capita and teacher/pupil ratio introduced in DACF formula.
Incumbent Party changes from NDC to NPP Formula Changes: Revenue per capita dropped; Potable water coverage added as indicator; Needs factor increased from 40% to 50%.
-Election year -Formula Changes: Nurses per capita and percentage of roads tarred added as indicator. Equality weight increased from 35% to 60%.
Equality factor reduced from 60% to 50%. Needs factor increases from 35% to 40%.
Percentage of taxable revenue changes from 5% to 7.5%
Election year
Increase in both responsive and service pressure factors from 5% to 10%. Reduction in equality factor from 50% to 40%.
-Election year -Changes in formula: Responsive factor reduces from 10% to 3%. Service pressure factor reduces from 10% to 2%. Equality factor increases from 40% to 50%. Needs factor increases to 45% from 40%. Services pressure factor decreases to 2% from 10%.
Equality factor reduces 45% from 50%. Responsive factor increases to 6% from 3%, and services pressure factor increases to 4% from 2%.
